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There are few moneyed corporations, the management of which
is not liable to change hands, every year, by the requirement of law
or charter that the board of directors shall be chosen annually.
Where the stock is held by but a few persons and as a permanent
investment, no inconvenience results, because the annual election
is always a re-election. But in the case of new enterprises, or cor-
porations with a widely distributed capital, unless some one man
or family holds an interest so large as to be practically controlling,
changes will not be infrequent. Under such circumstances a
vacillating policy often results, and plans of direction may be
abandoned, when but half tried, for others which meet with no
better fate.
This is a real evil, and the "voting-trust" is the remedy, to
which, of late years, there has been frequent resort.
A majority of the shares of the corporation are transferred to
one or more trustees, who become invested with the absolute legal
title. By the agreement for such transfer, the trustees are to hold
the stock for a term of years, and to vote on it at all meetings of
the corporation. Such votes, it is often provided, are to be cast
according to such directions as may be given from time to time by
some committee or other third party, designated in the agreement.
The trustee under the more recent and principal voting trusts
has been an incorporated trust company, which has issued to each
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shareholder, thus placing his stock in its hands, a "trust certifi-
cate." This declares him to be the owner of an equitable interest
in the whole trust stock, proportioned to his contribution to it;
and refers to the trust agreement as the measure of his rights
It also recognizes his right to transfer his equitable interest, at the
office of the trust company, which is then to issue a like certificate
to his assignee, on surrender of the original one.
It is obvious that a trust of this character virtually severs the
ownership of the stock from the power to vote on it. The legal
owner casts the vote, but at the dictation of a third party who is
not the equitable owner. And not only is the third party not the
equitable owner, but he may, in the progress of time, be directly
opposed to his interests. He represents the interests of the orig-
inal constituents of the trust, as they existed years before. Their
interests in the stock meanwhile may have been sold to others, of
different views, but these can take no share in the management of
the corporation, during the life of the trust.
The legal theory of the relation between the State and those
who receive from it a corporate franchise, is that it is one resting
on a personal confidence. The State issues, so to speak, its com-
mission to the corporators, as its "trusty and well-beloved" ser-
vants, fit to do this special work, which it commits to them. They
can, therefore, no more alienate the right to vote on their stock at
corporate meetings, than the citizen can alienate his right to vote
at public elections. Delegation is a. temporary alienation, and
therefore proxy voting is not recognized at common law, at meet-
ings of corporations. As was said in Taylor v. Griswold, 14 New
Jersey Law, 222, "the obligation and duty of corporators to attend
in person and execute the trust or franchise reposed in or granted
to them, is implied in and forms a part of the fundamental consti-
tution of every charter in which the contrary is not expressed."
And as this power of voting cannot, without special authority,
be transferred, neither can it ordinarily be suspended. Whoever
holds the legal title to the stock must be entitled to vote upon it.
An exception is made when public policy forbids such action.
If he holds as a bare trustee fcr the corporation itself, he cannot
be allowed to vote, because the corporation would naturally dictate
the vote, and it would therefore represent the wishes of the major-
ity of the directors, and presumably of the stockholders. If it
represented the unanimous wishes of the stockholders, it would be
useless to cast it, for it could not vary the result. If it represented
only a majority, to cast it would give that majority an undue
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weight, because greater than that proportioned to their stock
interest. While, therefore, stock is owned by the corporation,
whether standing in its own name or in the name of a naked
trustee, the right to vote on it is suspended. As was said by the
Court of Errors of New York in an old case, "It is not to be tol-
erated that a company should procure stock in any shape, which
its officers may wield to the purposes of an election, thus securing
themselves against the possibility of removal." a
Another exception may be allowed in cases where one corpo-
ration, without authority of law, buys stock in another, for the
purpose of controlling its management. Here again the principle
of a delectuspersonarum on the part of the State, which granted the
charter of the latter, comes into prominence, apart from the
objection against the purchase by the other, as ultra vires. This
charter was granted to A, B and C, and their associates. It was
granted to attain certain beneficial purposes, through their agency.
The purchasing company was incorporated for other purposes, or
if for similar purposes, then for their attainment, by working under
its own franchise. To allow it to influence the actions of a
different corporation, by sharing in the exercise of its franchise,
is to divert that franchise from the exclusive control of those to
whom it was exclusively granted. While therefore, a corporation
-may, no doubt, generally invest its surplus funds temporarily in
stock of another corporation, and vote on such stock as fully as
any of its associate stockholders, it cannot make such purchase
-for the purpose of controlling another franchise. b And if this
be done, the power of voting on the stock so purchased may be
denied or controlled by a Court of Equity, at the instance of one
of the bona fide stockholders. c
Another exception may exist when the stockholder, though
nominally such, is really a creditor of the corporation. The sub-
scriber to preferred stock often occupies virtually that position.
His subscription is a mere substitute for a loan. d If the preferred
stock could control the management of a corporation, there would
be no stimulus to develop its business beyond the point where it
earned the preferential dividends. The legislature may, there-
fore, consistently with the legal theory of the rights of stock-
holders, deny those holding preferred shares the right to vote.
a Ex farte Holmes, 5 Cow. 426, 435.
b Summer v. Marcy, 3 W. & M. 1o5.
c Pearson v. Concord R. R_, 13 American and English Railroad Cases, 102.
dWilliams v. Parker, 136 Mass. 204; Cotting v. New York & New Eng-
land R. R. Co., 54 Conn. x56, 170.
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"The promise to the preferred stockholders was to award them the first
net earnings-the holders of the common stock to share in such of the net
earnings as they might, by good management, be able to make, over and above
the 8 per cent. As the burden was upon the common stockholders, the power
to manage might fairly be left with them." e
If, however, a creditor of a corporation receives some of its
stock from it as collateral security, the law sanctions his right to
vote on it, unless objected to by the other stockholders, notwith-
standing the real ownership remains in the corporation. Here the
pledgee has a power coupled with an interest. f
Assuming, then, the general and almost universal rule to be
that the stockholder must retain the right to vote or to direct the
vote on his stock, we ask if any scheme of voting-trust can avoid
its application.
Some of the earlier trusts of this kind were designed, like that
in the Seligman case, to guarantee the control of the corporation
to creditors who would not otherwise extend their credit. On the
re-organization of a foreclosed railroad, for instance, holders of
income bonds might be willing to accept some similar security
from the new company, provided they could have a controlling
voice in the election of directors. A consideration for the temporary
relinquishment in their favor of the voting right might thus fairly
arise, and the whole scheme of re-incorporation might depend
upon it.
When the Reading railroad was in a position of great financial
.embarrassment, in 1887, such a voting-trust was devised, under
an arrangement between the principal creditors and stockholders.
Their bonds and stock were put under the control of a "Recon-
struction Board," with power to adjust securities, reduce interest
rates, create or exchange liens, and transfer stock. The stock was
to be ultimately held by five representatives of the different
interests concerned, and the majority of these dictated the stock
vote. They, in turn, issued "trust certificates" to the original
stockholders, stating that they owned a beneficial interest in the
shares which they had contributed, devoid of the right to vote.
Three years afterwards a holder of one of these trust certifi-
cates applied for a temporary injunction to prevent the execution
of the voting-trust at a coming meeting of the company, and the
case was fully argued on both sides before the Court of Common
Pleas, at Philadelphia. Judge. Hare, in delivering the opinion,
while resting the denial of the injunction primarily on the
e Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141; 24 North East. Rep. 496, 500.
f Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 28.
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ground that the case was not clear enough to warrant such prelim-
inary relief, discusses the general question involved at some length,
and in the following language:
- Under the statutes of this State, and on general principles, the right to
vote on stock cannot be separated from that ownership in such sense that the
elective franchise shall be in one man, and the entire beneficial interest in
another, nor to any extent, unless the circumstances take the case out of the
general rule. It matters not that the end is beneficial and the motive good,
because it is not always possible to ascertain objects and motives, and if such.
a severance were permissible it might be abused. The person who votes,
must, consequently, be an owner, but it does not follow that he must be the
only one. If, for instance, stock is pledged as a collateral, whether the debtor
or creditor shall vote depends on the terms on which the pledge is made. The
power is, under these circumstances, necessarily, to some extent severed from
the ownership, and the parties may, consequently, determine on which side it
shall lie. So much is conceded on each side of this controversy, and the ques-
tion is, can the debtor and creditor agree to lodge the vote in some one who is
to act for both, so long as the debt remains and the stock is held as security for
its payment?
"The counsel for the Reading Railroad contend that such a course is not for-
bidden by any rule or principle. In their opinion, there is no reason that for-
bids a stockholder to transfer his shares to one man as a security for a debt
due to another, with a stipulation that the holder shall have the right to vote,
and the case would be the same although the intermediary gave the debtor a
certificate that the equitable ownership was in him subject to the payment of
the amount due. No authority directly in point has been cited on either side,
but we incline to think that this view is correct and rules the case in hand. It
has indeed been argued for the complainants that the power conferred on the
members of the Voting Trust is not coupled with an interest, that they have a
dry legal title, with no active duties to perform, and that they should be com-
pelled to transfer the shares standing in their names to the persons who are the
beneficial owners.
"We think that this view errs in looking solely towards the stockholders.
They are not the only persons beneficially interested in the railroad ; the lien
creditors are also owners, and, if harmony be not preserved, may possess the
whole. It was, therefore, necessary to have some arbiter to reconcile interests
which were jarring and might diverge, and the want was supplied by the
Voting Trust. To decide that the election must be held exclusively on behalf
of the holders of the stock certificates would frustrate rather than give effect
to the principle that the votes should be cast by those who have a substantial
interest in the result. It is not easy to discern how the position of the members
of the Trust differs from that of an individual to whom stock is transferred as
a security for a debt to a third person. The only duty of such a holder is to
keep the certificate safely until the debtor pays or is in default, and then hand
it over to whichever party is equitably entitled. Had the duties of the Recon-
struction Board and Voting Trust been confided to a single body, with
authority to secure the creditors by executing mortgages, and then hold the
stock, with a right to vote in the way best calculuted to promote the common
good, it could hardly have been said that there were no active duties to uphold
the Trust or that it came to an end when the mortgages were executed. If
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this would have been the rule in the circumstances above supposed, it does not,
we think, vary the case that the end was sought to be obtained through two
closely related Boards, one supplementing and operating as a restraint on the
other. Without pronouncing an opinion on a point which remains open for
consideration on the final hearing, it is enough to say that the case is not suf-
ficiently clear to warrant a preliminaryinjunction thatwould prevent an election
on the day named in the charter, and might cause the irreparable injury which
such remedies are given to prevent."g
One of the first cases in which the validity of a voting trust,
which had not been constituted in aid of a re-organization, or to
set an embarrassed company on its feet again in the interest of
all concerned, came in question, was that of Hafer v. New York,
Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. in the Superior Court of Cincin-
nati. A controlling interest in the stock of the Cincinnati, Ham-
ilton & Dayton Railroad Co., another corporation, was bought up
in 1882 and placed in the name of H. J. Jewett, who was then
president of the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co.,
under an agreement that he should give an irrevocable proxy to
such persons as the Erie should appoint from time to time to vote
on the stock ; that his stock certificates should be left in the hands
of trustees ; and that they should issue to the respective owners of
the stock, trust, or "pool," certificates for amounts equal to their
respective equitable interests. On all stock thus pooled, the Erie
agreed to guaranty a certain dividend.
After three years had passed, one Hafer, who owned stock not
in the pool, brought an equitable action, claiming the pooling con-
trol to be illegal and void, and asking that Jewett be enjoined
against delivering any future proxy to the Erie.
The Erie filed a cross bill'demanding the proxy, or if the con-
tract should be decided illegal, that it be rescinded, and Jewett
enjoined against voting on the stock at any time.
The court, in an able opinion, from which the following quota-
tion is made, sustained a motion for a temporary injunction, and
held the trust contract illegal on two grounds: One that it put the
control of an Ohio corporation into the hands of a New York cor-
poration (the Erie), and the other, that the stockholders, who
united to make it, thereby violated their duty to their fellow
stockholders.
"The law has confided the care of the franchises and property of this com-
pany to the stockholders, and it is the duty of each stockholder to vote for
directors of the company with an eye singly to its best interests.
g Shelmerdine v. Welsh, Legal Intelligencer, Vol. XLVII, p. 26. (Jan.
17, i89o.)
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"Here a large number of the stockholders, for a valuable consideration,
have attempted to confer their right to vote upon the directors of another com-
pany. This transaction, apart from the want of power in the N. Y., L. E. &
W. R. R. Co. to enter into it, is plainly illegal. It places in the hands of per-
sons, in this connection unknown to the law, the powers which have been con-
fided to the stockholders, to be exercised by them according to their judgment,
will and discretion for the joint benefit of all concerned. The law presumes
that the pecuniary interest of a stockholder will be a motive to impel him to
vote in such a manner as will-promote the interests of the company. Such a
motive is entirely lacking in one who is not a stockholder, and if such a person
be empowered to vote for directors he may be subject to interests and motives
other than such as would conduce to the welfare of the company.
"A sale by a stockholder of the power to vote upon his shares, is illegal,
for very much the same reason that a sale of his vote by a citizen at the polls,
or by a director of a corporation at a meeting of the board, is illegal. Each is
a violation of duty ; in effect, if not in purpose, a betrayal of the trust The
adjudged cases appear unanimous on this point. h
"Both on the ground that the power is denied to one corporation thus to
acquire control of another, and that the stockholder cannot barter away the
right to vote upon his stock, we hold these contracts void.
"Such being the case we are met with the objection that they are executed
and cannot now be interfered with. Many of the cases holding that an executed
illegal contract will not be undone by the courts rest upon the doctrine that the
parties to such contracts are i&niari delicto, and for that reason the court will
not interfere. Such is Hooker v. De Palos, 28 0. S. 251 ; and see i Wharton
on Contracts, Sec. 352, et seq.
"It is obvious that the rule as to executed contracts cannot be applied to
the plaintiff for any such reason as that last mentioned, for he was not a party
to the contract. There are other cases wherein special circumstances made it
imperative as a matter of good faith, that the contract should not be interfered
with, and others when the protection of interests acquired by innocent parties
caused the courts to refrain.
"We find in this case no special circumstances which, in justice and good
faith, forbid interference with the further execution of this contract ; and as to
innocent parties, there is no suggestion that there are any, ixcept the pur-
chasers of the pool certificates issued by the three trustees to the stockholders;
but these, from the nature of the interest purchased as well as from the instru-
ment by which it was evidenced, received notice of the contract, and are, there-
fore. in no better or different position from that of the original holders of such
-certificates. In many respects the case is, at this point, parallel to Thomas v.
R. R. Co., roi U. S. 71, where it was held that an illegal lease of a railroad,
which had been in force and carried out by the parties for five years, was not
so far executed as to give a party to it the right to insist on the remainder of
the term, and that it was not only the right, but the duty of the parties to put
an end to it. There, as here, it was not sought to undo the executed portion of
the contract, but it was the unexecuted portion which was in question. So far
as this case and the remedy sought in it are concerned, the contracts are not
h Guernsey v. Cook. 120 Mass. 5ox; Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass.
309; Fuller v. Dane, i8 Pick. 484; Jones v. Scudder, 2 Cin. Sup. Ct Rep.
178 ; Fremont v'. Stone, 42 Barb. 169; Noel v. Drake, 28 Kansas, 265.
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executed but executory. By virtue of them the same acts are to be performed
year after year : on the one side the casting of the vote ; on the other the
making good of the dividends ; and in this respect their analogy to a lease is
very strong. On the facts now before us there is nothing to show that the
termination of the contracts at this time will do violence to the legal or equi-
table rights of any one.
"It is also suggested by counsel for the defendants that plaintiff has not
shown that he has, or will suffer, any pecuniary injury by reason of these con-
tracts, and that as he is not a party to them, he cannot be granted the relief he
seeks in this action. To this it is sufficient to say, that each stockholder in a
company has a right to a fair and lawful election of tne directors. State v.
Bonnell, 35 0. S. io. And if he could not resort to a court of equity to prevent
unfairness, when he had reason to apprehend it, until he could show pecuniary
injury, he might be made the victim of any sort of fraud or conspiracy, without
even a remedy in damages after the injury was done." i
The Court also, on the motion of the Erie road, after thus
declaring the contract illegal, enjoined Jewett against casting any
vote on the trust stock in his name. j
The result of this judgment was the attempt on the part of
the same stockholders to form a new voting-trust in a form which,
they, apparently, hoped would not be obnoxious to the same objec-
tions. A majority of the C. H. & D. stock was placed in the hands
of three trustees under an agreement made in i886, and to con-
tinue in force till i89i, and until determined thereafter by a two-
thirds vote of the consenting stockholders. Each stockholder
signing the agreement transferred his stock to the trustees, and
received from them an "assignable trust-certificate," for a corre-
sponding number of shares of the "beneficial interest" in the
capital stock of the road. The agreement made the trustees the
attorneys of the consenting stockholders to vote for them at all
meetings of the company, "and the power herein given shall con-
tinue irrevocably." Each trust certificate issued stated that it
"does not give the holder a right to vote at the meetings or elec-
tions of said company."
After three months, purchasers of a minority of the trust-cer-
tificates tendered theirs to the trustees, with a request that the
shares of stock represented by them be transferred to them, which
request the trustees refused to comply with. They then sued for
an injunction to prevent the trustees from voting on any of their
stock, and for a transfer of the stock to themselves.
The Court granted a temporary injunction, stating the law thus:
i Hafer v'. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R., 14 Weekly Law Btl-
letin, 68, 70.
j Ibid, p. 72.
VO TIVG - TRUSTS.
"The agreement made may be finally reduced to this. The entire bene-
ficial interest of the stock is severally vested in the certificate holder, the voting
power in the trustees ; and the situation does not differ materially from what
it would be if the stockholders, retaining their shares, had simply united in a
proxy authorizing the trustees to cast the vote of all of them for directors.
"We can perceive no reason why any number of shareholders, either by
means of proxy or by vesting the legal title in another, may not authorize him
to vote on their stock ; and as such is the substance of this agreement, we con-
sider it not illegal. So long as the parties to it, or their successors in interest,
are satisfied with it, no other person may complain, and the "irrevocable
clause" does not effect the rights of any one. But if the equitable owner elects
to withdraw the legal title from the holder thereof, the case assumes a different
aspect. As we have heretofore seen, it is a dry trust -the trustees having no
interest to set up in favor of its continuance ; but the parties have agreed that
this power to vote vested in the trustees shall be irrevocable. Can this pro-
vision be sustained as against the demand of the certificate holders -that they
may be permitted to revoke? If such demand be not complied with, the party
holding the entire beneficial interest in the stock can not cast the vote thereof,
while it may be voted upon by one having no interest in it or in the company;
and so it may come to pass that the ownership of the majority of the stock of a
company may be vested in one set of persons and the control of the company
irrevocably vested in others. It seems clear that such a state of affairs would
be intolerable, and is not contemplated by the law, the universal policy of
which is that the control of stock companies shall be and remain with the
owners of the stock. The right to vote is an incident of the ownership of
stock, and cannot exist apart from it. k The owners of these trust-cer-
tificates are, in our opinion, the equitable owners of the shares of stock
which they represent, and being such, the incidental right to vote upon
the stock necessarily pertains to them. They may permit the trustees, as
holders of the legal title, to vote in their stead, if they choose, but when they
elect to exercise the power themselves, the law will not permit the trustees to
refuse it to them.
"As to the allegations of the answer concerning the motives of the defend-
ants in entering into the agreement, we can only say that we see no reason to
doubt that their motives were laudable ; but that cannot materially affect the
case, as we have only to do with their action and its effect. So, also, as to the
allegation that plaintiff and certain of the defendants have combined to pur-
chase a controlling interest in the stock of the company for speculative pur-
poses, we can only say that it seems probable that they have combined to pur-
chase a majority of the shares, in order to secure control of the company; but
that is not of itself an unlawful proceeding, and as to their alleged speculative
purposes, no proof to sustain the allegation has been offered.
"Moreover, we are dealing with the rights of property, and it is no answer
to one's demand for the possession and control of his own property to say that
he intends to use it for an illegal purpose. The law gives to every one, not
under disability, the control of his own property, and imposes upon him the
duty of making lawful use o9 If the illegal proceedings feared by defend-
ants should be undertaken by any of the parties, the law will doubtless afford
remedies, and the courts be ready to apply them.
k Freon v. Carriage Co., 43 0. S. 38; Hafer v. N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry.
Co., 14 W. L. B. 68.
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"It follows that the motion for a temporary injunction should be granted
to the extent of restraining the trustees from voting the stock which is repre-
sented by certificates held by the plaintiff and the cross-petitioners. Should a.
mandatory order to compel the transfer of the' shares to the trust-certificate
holders be granted on preliminary hearing, it might work great injury to the
parties if the court make a different order upon final hearing. A mandatory
order is therefore refused." 1
Griffith v. Jewett was cited with approval by WHEELER, J., in
the Circuit.Court for the Southern District of New York, in 1887,
and the right of a stockholder, who had become a party to the cre-
ation of a voting-trust, to revoke his grant of authority to vote,
was affirmed, on a motion for a preliminary injunction. This case
grew out of one of these trusts, committed to Drexel, Morgan &
Co., of Nev York, by a majority of the stockholders of the
Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad Co., in i886, with the design of
effecting some sale or lease of the road, either directly or by a sale
of the shares thus deposited. The plaintiff sought an injunction
to prevent the trustees from voting on any of the trust stock, but
gained it only as to his own shares. His claim that the whole trans-
action constituted a trust for the corporation itself was held to be
untenable, without proof that it was accomplished by the use of
corporate funds. If the other stockholders were conteht with the
arrangement, he could not assume to revoke in their behalf. m
In an earlier case in the same court, a voting-trust was sus-
tained by Judge BLATCHFORD (now of the Supreme Court of the
United States), where the trustee was left free to vote at his own
discretion, and the attack came from an outside party. This was
the trust credited in stock of the Pacific Mail Steamship "Co., in
x864, to endure for four years. The trust agreement provided
that none of the contributing stockholders should sell his holding,
without first offering it at its market value, to the others, or the
trustees, and gave the trustees an irrevocable power of attorney
for voting. In 1867, parties interested in a rival company pro-
cured proxies to vote at an annual meeting, and planned to con-
trol the election by getting at the last moment a temporary injunc-
tion, ex parte, to prevent the trustees from voting, on the ground
of the illegality of the trust. The trustees obtained an injunction
against proceeding to any election, in which their votes were
excluded, and the court held that the trust was not against public
policy. n
1 Griffith v. Jewett. 15 Weekly Law Bulletin, 419, 422, 423.
m Woodruff v. Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co., 3o Fed. Rep. 91.
n Brown v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 5 Blatchford, 524, 527.
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Had the trustees, in this case, not had the right to vote accord-
ing to their own discretion, a different result might perhaps have
been reached. Certainly there is much to be said in favor of the
broader view that a voting trust constituted for a term of years,
and purporting to be irrevocable, is void, when attacked from any
quarter on grounds of public policy.
There can be no question that the almost universal require-
ments of annual elections, and the right of each share to a vote,
are meant to keep the management always under the control of
the actual owners.
This has been sometimes treated as the right of the beneficial
rather than the nominal or registered owner, as in Vowell v.
Thompson (3 Cranch Circ. Ct. 428), where the court said that one
in whose name stock stood, but who really held it as collateral
security, might be required to give a proxy to the pledgor to vote
at all meetings, until a forfeiture or foreclosure.
The voting-trust is an attempt by somV of the corporators to
bargain away their right to share in the control of the corporate
business, without consulting the wishes or welfare of the rest.
Whether anything short of unanimous consent can warrant such
an alienation by one stockholder of his right, to the possible preju-
dice of the rest, must depend on how far relations of trust and
mutual confidence are deemed by law to exist between them. That
a stockholder has some fiduciary relations and duties to his fellow
stockholder, which he cannot disregard at will, must now be con-
sidered as established. o
Is it not, then, opposed to these mutual obligations, and con-
trary to public policy to allow a part of those owning stock in a
common enterprise to tie up the entire management for a term of
years ? It burdens the firee transmission of property, and binds the
present to the past. It may, by sales of trust-certificates, bring
the owners of a majority of the stock in the trust, and also a major-
ity of the stock out of the trust, in accord, and yet leave them with
a board of directors in control, elected by a Trust Company, at the
bidding of the agents of former stockholders, and furthering pri-
vate interests of their constituents, in opposition to those of the
corporation.
In another Pennsylvania case, these views find support, Van-
derbilt v. Bennett, 6 Penn. County Court, 193, where the court
say (p. 203) :
o Fuller v. Dame, i8 Pick. 484; Guernsey V. Cook, 120 Mass. 5oi; Wood-
ruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309; West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 513.
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"We think that the trust agreement in question is absolutely void, as con-
trary to public policy, and because it substantially amounts to a repeal of our
Act of Assembly in regard to the right to vote incident to the ownership of
railroad stock."
A case involving the consideration of this question was recently
determined by the Superior Court of Connecticut, which, as it was
fully argued and made the subject of an elaborate decision, will be
reported in the supplement to the current volume (Vol. 6o.) of
Connecticut Reports (Starbuck v. Mercantile Trust Co.). The
majority of the shares of the Shepaug, Litchfield & Northern Rail-
road Co. had been placed in the name of the Mercantile Trust Co. of
New York, on a five year voting-trust, and trust-certificates had
been issued by the Company. The plaintiffs bought some of these
certificates, with notice, of course, of the trust, and then notified
the Company that they revoked the trust, so far as their interests
were concerned, and demanded a transfer of their stock. This
being refused, and an election being soon to occur, suit was
brought and judgment rendered for an injunction, and a transfer.
In the opinion of the court (ROBINSON, J.), the point now under
particular consideration was referred to, as follows :
"It is the policy of our law that an untrammelled power to vote shall be
incident to the ownership of the stock, and a contract by which the real owner's
power is hampered by a provision therein, that he shall vote just as somebody
else dictates, is objectionable. I think it against the policy of the law of this
StAte for a stockholder to contract that his stock shall be voted just as some
one who has no beneficial interest, or title in or to the stock, directs ; saving to
himself simply the title, the right to dividends, and perhaps the right to cast
the vote directed, willing or unwilling, whether it be for his interest; for the
interest of other stockholders, or the interest of the corporation or otherwise.
This I conceive to be against the policy of the law, whether the power so to
vote be for five years or for all time. It is the policy of the law of our State
that ownership of stock shall control the property and the management of the
corporation, and this cannot be accomplished, and this good policy is defeated,
if stockholders are permitted to surrender all their discretion and will, in the
important matter of voting, and suffer themselves to be mere passive instru-
ments in the hands of some agent who has no interest in the stock equitable or
legal, and no interest in the general prosperity of the corporation.
"And this is not entirely for the protection of the stockholder himself, but
to compel a compliance with the duty which each stockholder owes his fellow
stockholder, to use such power and means as the law and his ownership of
stock give him, so that the general interest of stockholders is protected, and
the general welfare of the corporation is sustained, and the busines3 conducted
by its agents, managers and officers, so far as may be, upon prudent and honest
business principles, and with just as little temptation to, and opportunity for
fraud, and the seeking of individual gains, at the sacrifice of the general wel-
fare, as is possible. This, I take it, is the duty that one stockholder in a corpo-
ration owes to his fellow stockholder; and he cannot be allowed to disburden
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himself of it in this way. He may shirk it, perhaps, by refusing to attend
stockholders' meetings, or by declining to vote when called upon, but the law
will not allow him to strip himself of the fiower to perform his duty. To this
extent, at least, a stockholder stands in a fiduciary relation to his fellow stock-
holders. For these reasons I hold that this trust agreement is void as against
the policy of the law of this State."
Similar doctrines were maintained in a recent case in the Court
of Chancery of New Jersey (PITNEY, Vice-Chancellor). The major-
ity of the shares of the Upper Delaware River Transportation Co.
had been put, under an irrevocable power of attorney, into the
control of a small stockholder, to vote on for five years, "for the pro-
motion of the best interests of said company," and to secure the
election of directors who would make and keep one of the constit-
uent stockholders in the office of manager at a salary of $2,500. oo,
during the five years, provided he so long faithfully dischirged its
duties. Some of the stockholders revoked this power, and an
injunction was granted at their instance. • The Vice-Chancellor
speaks thus of the fiduciary relation between the members of a
corporation :
I The theory upon which the capital of numerous persons is associated in
various proportions, in the shape of a-trading corporation, to be managed by a
committee of the stockholders, is that such committee shall truly represent and
be subject to the will of the majority in the interests of the stockholders. The
security of the small stockholders is found in the natural disposition of each
stockholder to promote the best interests of all, in order to promote his individ-
ual interests. A member of an ordinary partnership has an additional security
in the personal character of each of his partners, and may decline to be asso-
ciated with any he does not know and approve. But a stockholder in a corpo-
ration cannot control the fiersonliel of his associates, and must rely upon their
self interest alone.
"If a majority of the stock is owned by one person, he has no right to use
his power as such owner to advance his private interests at the expense of the
minority. And in like manner he has no right to depute to another, who has
little or no interest in the corporation, a power to use his stock for that purpose.
Such a deputation is the more dangerous because the person intrusted with the
power has no such inducement to promote the interests of the corporation as
the stock-owner has. Where the majority of the stock is owned by one man,
or set of men, acting in concert, the minority are, to the same extent, protected
by the natural interests of the majority to promote the real interests of the cor-
poration ; but where the person, who has little or no actual ownership, has the
unrestricted voting power of the majority of the stock, the minority loses this
protection, and what may be properly termed the underlying and fundamental
understanding and contract upon which the association is founded is abandoned
and broken. The motive which may induce the owner of a controllinginterest
in the corporation to deprive himself of and depute to another the power to use
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it as he may see fit, during a fixed period, may be of little consequence to his
associates, but is usually found in the consideration of personal gain."/0
Up to the present time, no case, it is believed, turning on the
validity of what may be termed the ordinary voting-trust, has
come into the reports of any court of last resort. The opinions,
from which quotations have here- been made, have been all from
ordinary trial courts, and citations have been made the more freely
from them for this reason, and because, if in print anywhere, they
are not easily accessible to the profession. This silence in the
reports on this topic is, no doubt, partly due to the fact that the
attacks, to which these trusts are most liable, are in the shape of
applications for a temporary injunction, with reference to an
impending stockholders' meeting. Whether the relief sought is
granted or not, as soon as the immediate emergency is past, the
motive for further litigation is less pressing. There has been also,
probably, a general acquiescence of counsel in the doctrines held
in the trial court, which, as we have seen, have been such as to
protect the real stockholder, even against himself, and to protect
each stockholder against oppression by the rest.
The present tendency of American government seems to be
towards greater care in guarding the interests of minorities. In
the matter of corporations, this has been manifested in constitu-
tional provisions introducing the principle of the cumulative vote,
and in statutes of many kinds. It is also seen in the disinclination
of the courts to interfere actively in aid of an effort to secure the
control of a majority of the stock, for speculative purposes. Thus
in Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 434, a decree for a specific perform-
ance was refused, when the contract was to sell a few shares of
stock, which were desired to secure the control of a trust, the rest of
the stock necessary having been secured largely on credit. "The
stock," say the court, "as now held, is scattered among a variety
of people and held in greater or lesser amounts. It is difficult to
see how the small stockholders, who have modest earnings invested
in it, the depositors who use it for the safe keeping of their money,
or the business public who look to it for accommodations in the
way of loans, are to be benefitted by the concentration of a majority
of its stock in the hands of one man, or in such a way that one
man and his friends shall control it. Especially is this so, when,
as here, an attempt is made to control it by the use of borrowed
j6 Cone's Ex'rs v. Russell, 21 Atlantic Reporter, 847, 849.
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capital. The temptation to use it for personal ends, in such case,
is very strong."
The institution of the private corporation has been one of the
great factors in the advance of modern society. It cannot exist
without adherence .to the principle of majority rule. But the
majority must come honestly by their power ; they must use it
without injustice ;- and the majority in power must, at least once a
year, be the majority in interest.
